The Rising Urgency of Thai National Security 2024

ASEAN foreign
Lightning illuminates the sky behind the gunner on a Thai military armored vehicle, as he keeps watch along the Moei river, under the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge in Mae Sot in Thailand's Tak province on Friday, April 12, 2024. (AP Photo/Sakchai Lalit)

The appointment of a new foreign minister would not affect international affairs functions but tough challenges lie ahead, expert says

Prof Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk, a lecturer with the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, believes turbulence may lie ahead following the recent government reshuffle. The Thai government and new foreign minister will be faced with border security-related issues, he wrote in an article entitled “The rising urgency of Thai national security 2024” published in the Matichon Weekly.

The appointment of Maris Sangiampongsa as new foreign minister will not affect the functions of foreign affairs as he was formerly a member of the ministry team. 

Maris replaces Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara, who resigned on Sunday, April 28, 2024 after losing the position of deputy prime minister, which he held concurrently, in the cabinet reshuffle.

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Maris was a career diplomat at the Foreign Affairs Ministry and a member of Parnpree’s advisory team.

In the article, Prof Dr. Surachart named the three biggest challenges Thailand and the new foreign minister have to deal with related to border security.

1.     Myanmar’s civil war

The civil war in Myanmar could well tear the country apart. The war has grown significantly and at an unprecedented rate in an already fragile setting since the military staged a coup on February 1, 2021. The hostilities can be regarded as a full civil war as they pits civilians who disagreed with the military seizing power and ousting the elected government against the junta. The war is not just about ethnic minority armed groups and local defense forces fighting against the Myanmar military.

In short, the war is not simply one against many but many against many.

The civil war escalated significantly in early 1994 after an offensive named Operation 1027, which was launched on 27 October 2023 by an alliance of three powerful ethnic rebel armies, seized control of towns and overran dozens of military bases. The junta lost control of townships where its battalions had been based for decades to resistance groups.

The situation went from bad to worse in recent days. The latest escalation in the conflict has now reached Yangon, which is one of Myanmar’s economic centers, signaling that heavy fighting will follow. Gains by the Myanmar resistance groups have been seen as a symbol of hope for a turning point to overthrow the military junta this summer.

However, this could well lead to an influx of refugees to Thailand.

Meanwhile, the implementation of the Myanmar’s People Military Service Law coupled with heavy fighting in Myanmar’s Myawaddy township in eastern Kayin state across the border from Thailand’s Mae Sot in Tak province and crackdowns on illegal “grey” business involving Chinese nationals in Thailand complicate the problems of the crisis in Myanmar, Surachart noted.

The expert has urged the Thai government and the Thai national security agencies to be well aware of this issue. Some Chinese nationals suspected of operating illegal activities are using the Thailand-Myanmar border areas as their operations base.

The geography means that Thailand serves as an escape route for refugees who flee to the Thai side in the wake of escalating conflict near the border. Massive refugee waves from Myanmar have been a cause for concern for the Thai government. If this continues, Thailand will be heralded as the ‘Poland of Southeast Asia’ and will face similar challenges to the Eastern European nation, which has played a major role in receiving refugees from the war in Ukraine. 

Thailand is not new to providing aid along the Thai-Myanmar border and is prepared for refugee situations and the protection of its border and people. At this time, however, the country should have a clear ‘preparedness and response policy’ in place at both the national and local levels, with great emphasis being placed on establishing the integrity of operations that involve several parties and ensuring that humanitarian assistance operations are carried out in compliance with international guidelines for humanitarian aid to prevent the exploitation of this situation.

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People cross the Moei river as they flee Myawaddy township in Myanmar to Thailand’s Mae Sot town in Thailand’s Tak province, Saturday, April 20, 2024. (AP Photo/Warangkana Wanichachewa)

Prof Dr. Surachart believes that Thailand should consider taking the role of ‘peace broker’ who helps mediate a peace deal between the two or more groups in conflict or pushes towards a ‘Myanmar Peace Forum’ to help lower the intensity of the conflict. The country should also ensure that Asean member countries including Laos, which is chairing the group this year, are informed about the aid and operation plans, which must be in line with the five points of the ASEAN consensus, the international diplomatic effort on Myanmar aimed at ending the crisis.

External communication is also of paramount importance, the international affairs expert added. It’s important for Thailand to communicate with the US, China, EU, Japan, Australia and India about the plans as the countries also play leading roles in creating peace in Myanmar.

More importantly, Thailand should consider seeking cooperation from NGOs which can contribute to bringing peace to Myanmar even though the former Thai government agreed to the Myanmar military junta’s request to not allow representatives from NGOs to get involved in any operations along the border. Thailand should consider removing itself from this agreement under the current circumstances, Surachart noted. 

However, ‘thought’ is a fundamental tool of every action. To ensure successful operations, the Thai government should formulate a policy and assign the roles and powers of the prime minister and the relevant government agencies. Most importantly, it should make sure that all the government leaders and the military leaders fully understand the current crisis in Myanmar and the solutions to problems.

2.     Conflicts in the Deep South of Thailand

2024 was an important year for the peace restoration deal in the Deep South, with hope turning into frustration and deep concerns.

The problems of violence and insurgency in the three southern border provinces of Thailand are now back in the spotlight following an agreement to develop a Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP) which is intended to bring peace to the Deep South.

The agreement has faced strong criticism from experts. Commenting during a public forum on peace talks in southern Thailand, they said the draft plan is not a positive approach to address the problems, particularly in terms of the demand made by Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu-Patani (BRN). It appears that the movement wishes to expand the problem areas to include some parts of Songkhla; and not limit them to only three southern border provinces through the agreement.   

As such, the ‘comprehensive peace plan’ would become a ‘complicated plan’, Surachart said.  It’s still unclear whether the proposed plan, which is supported by some NGOs will bring peace to southern Thailand or build ‘bargaining power’ for the BRN in any negotiations.

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Prime Minister Srettha Thawisin, the and his delegation visited Krue Se Mosque in Tanyong Lulo Subdistrict, Mueang Pattani District, on February 27, 2024.

In addition, when Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin visited the three southern border provinces in an effort to boost the economy, he didn’t talk about the violence and insurgency issues in the area. Experts and observers question if a focus on economic growth only will help address the violence and insurgency problems of the Deep South. The government’s actions raise questions as to whether it has a well-designed strategy, a strategic direction, or even a policy to end the conflict and violence. 

Villagers of the three southern border provinces have raised doubts as to whether the leader of the Thai government is neglecting his duty to solve the state violence, which is one of the significant impediments to economic growth and indeed how such growth can be achieved.

However, the government must be fully aware that tackling violent issues driven by a ‘war with insurgency’ in the three southern border provinces requires a comprehensive strategy derived from multi-dimensional thinking rather than a plan driven by one-dimensional thinking.

In short, ending war requires a clear strategy, not just a dream. Dreams without strategies are just dreams. They cannot stop violence and fighting. Surachart has urged the Thai government to take this opportunity to seriously review its strategy for the Deep South and think about how to make economic factors part of this strategy to help restore peace.  

3.     Maritime Border Dispute

The Thai government’s attempts to resolve the Cambodian-Thai land and maritime border disputes have appeared to ignite nationalist and right-wing sentiments.

In 2024, the Cambodian and Thai governments reopened talks on the overlapping maritime claims but already nationalists and right-wing circles are making waves that risk complicating relations between Cambodia and Thailand.

Cambodia and Thailand’s talks over the land surrounding Preah Vihear temple in 2008 awakened ill-feeling and caused tensions and clashes between the two nations. 

Surachart explained that the most recent talks between Cambodia and Thailand over the maritime dispute are focused on the ‘Overlapping Claims Area’ (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, which is already complicated in itself.

The attempts made by right-wing circles are seen as a mechanism to create a role for them in political activities and to protest against the Thai government. The moves are based on nationalism in relation to border issues, and focus both on the decades-old dispute over Preah Vihear, an ancient Hindu temple complex located between the two countries, and overlapping territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand.

These right-wing circles are using the conspiracy theory as a tool to draw the attention of people. The expert thus warns that the Thai government to exercise extreme caution over any actions it takes that could make the conspiracy theory a reality.

The overlapping maritime claim issues are very complicated, Surachart noted. The Thai government has been dealing with the long-standing territorial issue for years.

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Thailand Cambodia Overlapping Claims Area Source: PE

Following an unresolved claim between Cambodia and Thailand, the Thai government decided to award petroleum concessions in the overlapping areas in the Gulf of Thailand in 1968. However, it later notified the concessionaires to suspend all activities in the areas until the government could reach an agreement with the Cambodian government on the exploitation of resources for the mutual and equal benefits of the two countries, reminiscent of Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (MTJDA).

The MTJDA is the area of overlapping continental shelf claimed by both Malaysia and Thailand, located in the lower part of the Gulf of Thailand. The area was agreed by the Thai government and the Malaysian government to be jointly explored and exploited for non-living natural resources for the mutual and equal benefits of the two countries.

The bilateral negotiations over the OCA are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Thailand and Cambodia in 2001 which serves as a framework.

Surachart explained that it’s common to have a framework for negotiations that guide how parties will work together and define responsibilities and expectations. Even though parties have agreed to cancel the MoU, the documents can be reviewed, updated and reassigned as a new round of negotiation process opens.

The move has reignited the right-wing sentiment and they are criticizing the Thai government for being willing to draw up an agreement in exchange for maritime benefits. They have called on the government to cancel the MoU and ‘innocently denied’ the positive response to this agreement.

The Thai government should not neglect its duty to solve the problems of political movements that use nationalism to achieve political goals which can affect the government’s stability. Surachart has urged the government to look back and review lessons learned from past experiences in 2008 in connection with the Pheu Thai Party.  

He added that the Thai government must clarify the issues to the public including the media so that they understand what is involved and thus prevent the use of nationalism to ignite ‘the power of political movement’ that would affect relations between Cambodia and Thailand.

4.     Additional issues

Additionally, Surachart said, the Thai government should do more on these two issues; (1) new Chinese migrants in Thailand and their business expansion in the country; and (2) Thai workers held hostage in Gaza.

Thailand is experiencing an influx of Chinese migrants in what is seen as the country’s new social and political phenomenon. Many Chinese nationals have businesses in Thailand and these are causing a flood of cheap Chinese products into the Thai market, hurting local businesses. This would affect Thai national security in the long term. The government needs to figure out how to solve this issue. 

Last but not least, the Thai government should step up its effort to help Thai nationals captive in Gaza. No one should be left behind. Even though the hostages have nothing to do with national security, the lecturer said, the Thai government should handle the issue for the sake of ‘human security’ of the Thai workers themselves and their families.  

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About the author

Surachart Bamrungsuk1
Professor Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk

Professor Emeritus Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk is an academic specializing in security and military strategy.

He graduated with a degree in Political Science and Government from Chulalongkorn University, an M.A. in Political Science from Cornell University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

Prof. Dr. Surachart is one of the “October People,” referring to former students who participated in the fight against dictatorship in 1973 and 1976, which was heavily suppressed by the authorities. Later, he played a political role in academia and is also a writer whose articles have been published in Matichon and Matichon Weekly for four decades.